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SUMMARY 
Full-scale light-airplane crashes simulating stall-spin accidents 
were conducted to determine the decelerations ~o which occupants are 
exposed and the resulting harness forces encountered in this type of 
accident . Crashes at impact speeds from 42 to 60 miles per hour were 
studied. The airp~_anes used were of the familiar steel-tube, fabric-
covered, tandem, two-seat type. 
In crashes up to an impact speed of 60 miles per hour, crumpling of 
the forward fuselage structure prevented the maximum deceleration at the 
rear-seat location from exceeding 26 to 33g. This maximum g value ap-
peared independent of the impact speed. Restraining forces in the seat-
belt - shoulder-harness combination reached 5800 pounds. The rear-seat 
occupant can survive crashes of the type studied at impact speeds up to 
60 miles per hour, if body movement is restrained by an ade~uate seat-
belt - shoulder-harness combination so as to prevent injurious contact 
with obstacles normally present in the cabin. Inwardly collapsing cabin 
structure, however, is a potential hazard in the higher-speed crashes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Light-airplane accident data, compiled by Crash Injury Research of 
Cornell University Medical College, indicate that human beings have 
often withstood decelerations in excess of those imposed in airplane 
crashes involving extensive damage to the airplane structure (ref. 1). 
This study also correlates the extent of damage to the airplane struc-
ture with the injury incurred by the occupants during crash accidents. 
The Cornell work indicates that the stall-spin is a common light-airplane 
accident configuration. In this type of crash, fatalities often occur; 
but the passenger in the rear seat fre~uently survives when ade~uately 
restrained. Collapse of the front portion of the cabin is often fatal 
to the front passenger. However, the magnitudes of acceleration to 
which the occupants were subjected during these accidents were unknown. 
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The NACA Lewis laboratory has studied the accelerations resulting 
from simulated stall- spin accidents at impact speeds of 42, 47, and 
60 miles per hour . In these studies, dummy passengers were installed in 
small two - seat, tandem airplanes (fig . lea) ) , and a record was obtained 
of the accelerations transmitted through the airplane structure to the 
rear- seat occupant during the crash . The accelerations and the harness 
forces recorded on the dummy were related to the events in the crash 
sequence by comps.ring them with the crash action recorded on motion-
picture film . The data obtained in these crashes are intended as a con-
tribution to the general background of engineering information required 
for the design of improved seats and harnesses for greater crash safety . 
APP MATUS AND PROCEDURE 
'l'ype of Crash Simulated 
The light - airplane crashes were designed to simulate accidents in 
which the airplane stalls and strikes the ground just as it enters a 
spin . An inspection of stall- spin accident records indicates that 
generally the left wing tip, the left landing- gear wheel, and the engine 
of the airplane strike the ground simultaneously . To simulate such a 
crash, the airplane was made to strike an earthen crash barrier as shown 
in figure l ea) . The barrier in this arrangement corresponds to the 
ground in an actual crash. 
In these tests , the approach to the crash barrier was made in a 
horizontal direction instead of a nearly vertical direction as would be 
the case in a real accident; therefore , the forces in the direction of 
motion are in error by a factor of approximately ' 1 unit of gravity . This 
error in forces is small in comparison with the forces measured in the 
crash . 
Operating Technique 
I n a crash, the ai rplane was propelled by its own power along a 
guide rail tm-rard the crash barrier . A slipper, located at the end of 
a tongue, gui ded the airplane t o the crash barrier . This guide slipper 
was designed to fit around the top flange of the guide rail (fig . l (b )) 
in such a manner as to prevent the slipper from leaving the rail in either 
a vert i cal or a lateral directi on . I n order to prevent the slipper and 
tongue assembly from transmitti ng forces to the airplane structure during 
the crash, a 12 - inch- di amet er steel tube (fig . l (c )) was i nstalled at the 
end of the rail to allow the s~ipper and the tongue assembly to pass 
underneath the crash barri er . The momentum of the slipper and tongue 
assembly carried it into the steel tube upon airplane impact with the 
crash barr ier . The rear of the tongue was pinned to the airplane with a 
3/ 32- inch- diameter pin (fig . l ed )) that sheared under a load of 
150 pounds . 
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In order to support the airplane in flight attitude as it proceeded 
u~manned down the runway, a tail truss was bolted to the tail-wheel 
attachment bracket (fig . l ee )), the tail-wheel assembly having been 
removed. A l i S- inch aluminum plate that was flush - riveted to the bottom 
of the tail truss slid along on top of t he guide r ail . This t ail truss 
we ighed approximately 2! pounds mor e than t he t a i l -wheel assemb l y t hat 
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it replaced . The gross weight of each airplane was 1200, 1013 , and 1261 
pounds, respectively, f or t he cr ashe s a t 42 , 47, and 60 mph. The Civil 
Aeronautics Administration cert ified maximum we i ght of t he a irplane is 
1220 pounds . 
An anchor pier (fi g . l (f)) was installed on the guide rail at the 
rear of the airplane t o retain the airplane under take - off power without 
brakes . A tensiometer measured the static thrust of the airplane just 
before being released. 
The earthen crash barrier (fig . l ea )) located at the end of the 
guide rail was constructed of di rt compacted to have a bearing pressure 
of 5900 pounds per square foot on the front surface into which the air-
plane crashed. This bearing pressure corresponds to the local undis -
turbed clay turf soil . The barrier was 50 feet long, 9~ feet hi gh , and 
22 feet thick at the base, s l oped at an angl e of 550 to the verti cal 
axis, and oriented 660 to the axis of the rail, as shown in the sketch 
in figure 2. 
The dummy i n the front seat (f i g . 3 ) was a standard Air Force dummy 
designed for use in the testi ng of parachutes . This dummy had a skeleton 
of steel members pinned at the joints wi th bolts . The skeleton was 
covered with felt paddi ng, and the skin was made of a heavy canvas 
cloth . No attempt was made in the construction of the dummy to simulate 
the rigidity of the human body , although t he mass distribut i on of the 
component parts of the dummy was s i mi lar t o t hat of a human bei ng . This 
dummy was held in the seat by a standard 2-inch seat bel t attached to 
the front seat of the airplane. 
The Air Force anthropomorphi c dummy was i nst all ed i n the r ear seat 
of the airplane as shown i n f i gure 3 . This dummy was desi gned by the 
Wri ght Air Development Center Aero Medical Laborat ory. The dummy skele -
ton was made of steel, and some members were made to simulate the s t rengt h 
of those of the human body. Elast ic shock cords were used t o simulate 
muscles or tendons, and sponge rubber was used for the flesh and s kin. 
This dummy wa s a r easonable replica of the human body in both mass di s -
t ribution and r e silience of human tissue. However, the reaction of the 
dummy to dece lerat i on diff ered from the human body because of the ab -
s ence of muscular r eflex action. The seat belt and the shoulder harness 
used t o rest r a in this dummy were attached to the basic structure of the 
airplane . 
--- ~- ------- --
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The airplane configuration and the dummy installation for each of 
the three impact crashes are given in the following table: 
Impact Seat Type of dummy Restraining harness Airpl ane 
speed, location fuel-tank 
mph contents 
60 Front Parachute 2-inch seat belt 72 lb 
Rear Anthropomorphic 1. Shoulder harness water 
2. 3-inch seat belt (dyed red) 
47 Front Empty 
seat 
removed 
Rear Anthropomorphic 2-inch and 3-inch 
seat-belt combina-
tion 
42 Front Parachute 2-inch seat belt Empty 
Rear Anthropomorphic l. Shoulder harness 
2. 3-inch seat belt 
INSTRUMENTATION 
Acce1eromet·ers 
Accelerations of the head and the chest of the anthropomorphic 
dummy installed in the rear seat of the airplane were obtained from 
telemetered accelerometer data. Accelerometer s also were used to meas-
ure the accelerations on the airplane structure at the rear seat. Meas-
urement of the forces exerted by the dummy on the seat belt and shoulder 
harness was made by tensiometers installed at each attachment point of 
the restraining harness. 
Three accelerometers, attached to the fuselage-floor structure at 
the rear seat, measured accelerations along the longitudinal, vertical, 
and lateral axes of the airplane. Three accelerometers, installed on 
the chest of the anthrollomorphic dummy, measured accelerations (1) longi-
tudinally (perpendicular to the spine in the fore and aft plane ), 
(2) vertically (parallel to the spine), and (3) laterally (left ffitd 
right) • One accelerometer was installed in the head of the anthropo-
morphic dummy to measure ac~elerations perpen(licular to the face. 
Tensiometers 
Tensiometers were installed at each end of the seat belt and at the 
anchor ~oin~ on the shoulder harness of the anthropomorphic dummy to 
measure the forces exerted on the restraining harness by the dummy 
throughout the crash. 
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Telemeter System 
A simple telemeter system that was readily available afforded a 
convenient method for obtaining continuous records throughout the crash 
of the accelerations and the harness forces . The telemeter transmitter 
was loc ated in the airplane as shown in figure 4(b ). The recei ving and 
recording station, as located in the operations bui lding (ref. 2) , is 
shown in figure 4 (c) • 
Two types of transducer were used in the telemeter configuration. 
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The accelerometers were of the variable - inductance, suspended- slug type 
(fig. 4(d) ) and were designed to have a l i near change i n i nductance from 
-90 to 90g in the sensitive direction and to have at least a 100: 1 
attenuation of response in the two nonsensitive dir ections . The ten-
siometers were also in the variable - inductance category of transducers. 
They consisted of two rigidly interconnected beams that spaced a powdered 
iron slug within a coil (fig . 4(d)) . Tension appli ed by the seat belt or 
shoulder harness caused the beams to deflect, resulting in a relative 
displacement between the slug and coil and thereby producing a change i n 
the apparent inductance at the terminals. Location of instrumentation 
is given in the following table: 
Channel Measured Direction Location Figure Range 
quantity 
1 Acceleration Longitudinal Chest of d.ummy 4(e) - 88 to 3Sg 
2 Acceleration Vertical Chest of dummy 4(e) - 91 to 42g 
3 Acceleration Lateral Chest of dummy 4(e) - 65 to 66g 
4 Acceleration Longi tudi nal Fuselage floor 4(g) - 91 to 3Sg 
at rear seat 
5 Acceleration Vertical Fuselage floor 4{g) - Sl to 32g 
at rear seat 
6 Acceleration Lateral Fuselage floor 4 (g ) - 50 to 50g 
at rear seat 
7 Tension ------------ Shoulder harne ss 4 (h) o to 5000 lb 
of rear dummy 
S Acceleration Longi tudinal Head of rear 4 (f ) - 43 to 45g 
dummy 
9 Tension 
------------
Seat belt , left 4 (i) o to 4800 lb 
side of rear 
dummy 
10 Tension ------------ Seat belt) 4 (i) a to 5000 lb 
right side of 
rear dummy 
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Figure 4(a) shows the general location of the instrumentation in 
the airplane. The ten channels available in the telemeter system were 
used to measure the quantities listed in the preceding table. Fig-
ures 4(e) to (i), listed in the table, show t he specific location of 
each transducer as installed on the dummy or in the airplane. 
The transmitting station and batteries w·ere protected by two alumi-
num boxes, one installed inside the other. ~rhe inner box, to which the 
station and batteries were rigidly mounted, 'faS suspended on all sides 
by corrugated pasteboard as shown in figure 4(b). The outside aluminum 
box was supported in the airplane by a mount built up of welded tubing. 
This unit is shown before and after installat ion in the airplane in 
figure 4(b). The construction was designed to limit the expected short-
duration, high-peak accelerations imposed on the transmitting station . 
The separate units of this transmitting stati on were previously checked 
along the three major axes on a spin-type g-t able and on a vibrating 
table at values up to 25g from 0 to 200 cycles per second with less than 
1/2 percent of full-scale change in the transmitted data. (This is not 
an indication of flat response to 200 cps, as the accelerometers were 
not on the shake tables; this test was strict ly an equipment survival 
check.) In the 47-mph crash, a channel was left vacant. The subcarrier 
oscillator for this channel was tuned with a fixed inductance to the 
center frequency of the channel and allowed t o operate through the crash. 
The oscillograph records of the ten channels of telemetered data from 
the 47-mph crash are shown in figure 4(j). The record of fixed channel 7 
clearly shows that the accelerations carried through to the equipment 
section had .no effect on the data. 
The telemeter system, exclusive of transducers and recorders, 
according to statistical unpublished data has an accuracy of ±2 percent 
of full-scale amplitude and a frequency response of flat within ±2 per-
cent from steady-state conditions to 200 cps The nature of FM dis-
criminators is such that an increase in amplitude lowers the limit of 
flat frequency response; and in this case it must be stated that for 
steady-state levels the full-scale amplitude was faithfully reproduced, 
while at 200 cps the amplitude had to be held within :20 percent of full 
scale from the center of the range in order t o have within ±2 percent 
flat frequency response. The data in this report are within this region 
with the exception of the case in which the rear dummy's head hit the 
neck of the forward dummy in the 60 -mph crash. The accelerometers had a 
measured undamped natural frequency of approximately 300 cps. They were 
filled with 2400-centistoke silicone damping fluid and individually 
checked for a damping ratio of 0.60 to 0.64. This damping ratio resulted 
in flat response within 5 percent, up to 85 percent of the undamped 
natural frequency. Thus the accelerometer response was flat within 
5 percent to 250 cps. The seat-belt and shoulder-harness tensiometers 
had a calculated undamped natural frequency (first mode) of 1920 cps; 
and, since an undamped system has a flat response within S percent up to 
22 percent of the undamped natural frequency, this system did not require 
any damping, being flat within 5 percent up t o 420 cps. 
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The frequency responses of the recording galvanometers used in the 
60 -mph crash were chosen with a specific measurement in mi nd and were as 
follows: Galvanometers which had a response that was flat within 5 per -
cent to 300 cps were used for recording the three components of accelera-
tion of the rear dummy1s chest and of the floor under the rear seat and 
t he acceleration in the top of the dummy 1s head . The galvanometers used 
to record the belt tensions were flat within 5 percent to 180 cps . An 
inspection of the telemeter records revealed that the basic data were 
relatively low in frequency, except for the accelerations on the floor, 
and the response of the system was well over that required . The high-
frequency response of the galvanometers , however , di d produce records 
that were hard to read because of the intermodulation present . In thi s 
crash, bursts of noise occurred simultaneously in all the recorded 
channels throughout the run and almost obliterated the crash record . 
By taxi tests on an airplane the source of this noise was determined to 
be unbonded metal parts chaffing together . This problem was overcome by 
using short heavy ground straps around all metallic links, and by cover -
ing the control cables with plastic tubing to prevent intermittent 
grounding to adjacent metal (fig. 4(k)) . In order to produce cleaner, 
easier-to-read records, without impairing the accuracy of the data, the 
galvanometers used to record the chest accelerations and belt tensions 
were changed in the 42- and 47 -mph crashes to a type having a frequency 
response of flat within 5 percent to 100 cps . 
Airplane Velocity 
The ground speed of the airplane was determined by electronic timers 
as described in reference 2. In addition, the ground speed was deter -
mined by time - displacement studies of high-speed motion pictures. 
Motion-Picture Cameras 
Motion-picture cameras located on the various camera platforms 
around the crash barrier recorded the destruction of the airplane at the 
barrier, the area of fuel spillage, and the motion of the dummies 
installe~ in the fuselage. 
Mitchell, Cine, Fastax, and K- 24 cameras , all operating electrically 
within the range of film speeds shown in refere nce 2, were used in each 
crash . The locations of the camera stations are shown in figure 2 . 
Because the natural illumi nation of the cabin area in the first 
crash was insufficient to record clearly the action of the dummies , addi -
tional light was provided for subsequent crashes . This light source 
comprised a bank of 96 tungsten, focal-plane , flash bulbs (fig . 4(1) ). 
These bulbs were set off in sets of four distributed along the decelerat -
ing distance of the airplane . Twenty- four sets of four flash bulbs pro-
duced peak illumination for a duration of 1 second . 
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Calculated Acceleration Curves 
Curves of longitudinal deceleration of the engine in all three 
crashes and of the fuselage floor under the rear seat in the 60-mph 
crash were calculated from the photographic time - displacement data with 
equal time increments of 0 . 005 second. Calculation of engine decelera-
tion was necessary, since no accelerometers were installed on the engine 
because of the limited number of telemetering channels available . 
Longitudinal fuselage deceleration during the 60-mph crash was calcu-
lated, because the accelerometer data in this crash were rendered 
invalid by structural failure of the members on which the accelerometers 
were mounted. 
Definition of Accelerations 
Since the accelerations along the longitudinal, vertical, and lat-
eral axes are to be considered, it is necessary to designate a direction 
for each . 
The sketches in figure 5 of seated dummies show clearly the direc-
tion and define the linear accelerations along the longitudinal and 
vertical axes . Accelerations along the longitudinal axis of the airplane 
that increase the forward speed of the airplane are positive \+g) as 
shown in figure 5(a). When the airplane experiences positive acceleration 
in the longitudinal direction, the dummy's back presses against the seat 
back . In a negative acceleration in the longitudinal direction, the dummy 
moves forward with respect to the seat and is restrained by the seat belt 
and shoulder harness as shown i n figure 5(b) . To simplify language, 
" deceleration" will be used in place of negative longitudinal accelera-
tion ( - g ). Accelerations along the vertical axis in which the dummy is 
thrust upward are called "posi ti ve accelerations" (+g) as shown in 
figure 5 (c ). Accelerations in which the body is pulled downward by the 
shoulder harness and seat belt (fig. 5(d)) are called "negative accelera-
t i ons" ~ - g ). Left or right lateral accelerations produce a respective 
displacement of the dummy to the left or the right from the neutral 
position . 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Acceleration Along Longitudinal .Axis of Airplane 
SO-Mph crash . - In this section a comparison is made of the longi -
tudinal acceleration of the fuselage at the rear seat with respect to 
the engine , and the acceleration experienced by the rear dummy's chest 
and head in response to the airplane accelerations . The shoulder -harness 
and seat -belt forces associated with these accelerations are also dis -
cussed . 
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In figure 6(a) the acceleration of the airplane structure and of 
the dummy are compared for the crash in which the airplane speed was 
60 mph upon impact with the barrier. Time is counted from the moment 
t he airplane propeller tip strikes the barrier. The deceleration on the 
engine (fig. 6(a)) rises rapidly at a rate of 4130g per second to a 
peak value of 62g and remains at this value for 0.015 second. The 
deceleration of the fuselage is attenuated by the crumpling of the struc-
ture between the engine and the fuselage floor at the rear- seat position. 
Thi s crumpling reduces the rate of onset of deceleration from 4130g per 
second on the engine to 1500g per second on the floor and also reduces 
the magnitude of this deceleration . Four peak values of deceleration 
occur on the fuselage floor. These peaks vary from 25 to 33g and occu:c 
at time intervals of approxi.mately 0.023 second . 
A delay of 0.023 second between the onset of fuselage floor decelera-
tion and the onset of chest deceleration is believed to be the forward 
movement of the chest of the dummy of approximately 2 inches relative to 
the seat. This relative forward movement of the chest is an accumulation 
of displacement partly due to (1 ) slack in all components of the restrain-
ing harness, (2) elongation of the harness under the initial load) and 
(3) the resilience of the sponge - rubber flesh of the abdominal , thoracic, 
and shoulder regions of the dummy . The resulting overshooting of peak 
values of the chest deceleration, when compared with the deceleration of 
the fuselage floor, is then dependent upon the mass - spring characteris -
tics of the dummy and its restraining mechanism . The magnitude of the 
first 'peak of chest deceleration of 34g thus exceeded the first peak value 
of fuselage floor deceleration of 25g by 28 percent . A maximum chest de-
celeration of 50g was obtained at 0.118 second after impact . 
After the slack in the seat belt and shoulder harness is taken up 
by the beginning of deceleration of the dummy, the dummy, the restraining 
belts, and the airplane structure begin to respond to the decelerative 
force applied at the nose of the airplane as components of an inter-
dependent elastic system. Because the mass of the dummy is comparable 
to that of the fuselage, the fuselage floor deceleration may be directly 
affected by the load imposed on the airplane structure by the dummy. 
Thus, once the rear dummy reaches its first peak of deceleration at 
0.073 second following impact, the fuselage floor deceleration r esponds 
in some measure to the change in loading on the airplane structure imposed 
by the deceleration of the dummy . Since the gross airplane weight was 
1260 pounds, the weight of the rear dummy approximately 200 pounds and 
that of the front dummy 155 pounds, the interrelation of the deceleration 
history of the dummies with that of the fuselage under the rear seat 
during the crash is apparent. Following the first peak in fuselage 
deceleration (fig.' 6 (a)), this interrelation appears as each peak in 
fuselage floor deceleration occurs at approximately 0.01 second after 
the corresponding peak i n dummy deceleration. The last marked peak value 
in floor deceleration follows the last peak value in dummy deceleration 
by 0.007 second. 
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Head deceleration in the 60-mph crash began at 0.062 second after 
impact, following a delay of 0.01 second after the beginning of chest 
deceleration. Head deceleration did not reach appreciable magnitudes 
until 0.10 second after impact. The delay in the build-up of head 
deceleration was due to movement of the head relative to the chest up 
to 0.10 second after impact. The rise in head deceleration between 
0.10 and 0.11 second indicates contact of the chin with the chest. This 
contact was observed in the motion-picture film at about 0.10 second 
after impact. 
The sharp rise in deceleration that began at 0.11 second indicates 
contact of the rear dummy's helmet with the steel neck-joint of the 
front dummy. The manner in which the helmet contacted the neck joint 
of the front dummy was established in the post-crash analysis. The 
inset in figure 6(a) shows a post-crash reconstruction of this contact. 
Two peaks of over 100g deceleration were recorded, but, since the 
response of the instrument for such sharp rises was not flat for values 
above 55g, any values above this amount are subject to unpredictable 
error. 
47 -Mph crash . - Similar engine-fuselage-·chest-head data for the 
47-mph crash are presented in figure 6(b). The peak engine deceleration 
in the 47-mph crash reached 46g in 0.041 second after impact, then 
dropped to a plateau of 31g. The engine deceleration exceeded 31g for 
0.016 second. Crumpling of the airplane structure is responsible for 
the decline of the maximum deceleration of 46g at the engine to 32.5g 
at the fuselage floor. Four peak values of deceleration occur on the 
fuselage floor and vary from 32.5 to 27.5g for approximately 0.38 sec-
ond. As shown by figure 6(b), onset of dummy chest deceleration lagged 
onset of engine deceleration by about 0.01 second. The rate of increase 
of chest d'eceleration of 980g per second was appreciably reduced from 
4600g per second at the engine and 4300g per second at the fuselage. 
'Maximum chest deceleration of the dummy reached 46g by 0.088 second after 
impact. 
Head deceleration of low magnitude persisted until 0.122 second ' 
after impact. The rapid increase in head deceleration, beginning at 
0.122 second, occurred after the head had broken loose from the shoulders. 
Observation of the motion-picture data definitely established failure of 
the neck by 0 . 121 second. [Failure of the neck of this dummy is in no 
way indicative of the probability of decapitation of a human being, as 
humans have repeatedly survived decelerations up to 45g with no indica-
tion of neck injury (ref. 3)J 
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42-Mph crash. - Data for the 42 -mph crash are presented in fig -
ure 6 (c). The maximum engine deceleration was 32g with a duration of 
deceleration in excess of 30g existing for 0 . 016 second . Reduction in 
the r ate of onset of fuselage deceleration from that of the engine was 
not as pronounced in the lower - speed crashes as it was i n the 60 -mph 
crash. The maximum engine deceleration of 30 to 32g was reduced to 26g 
at the fuselage-floor position . Maximum peak deceler ation of the dummy's 
chest reached 32.5g by 0.084 second after impact . A second peak chest 
deceleration of 26.5g occurred at 0 . 125 second after impact . 
No appreciable deceleration of the rear dummy's head i n the 42-mph 
crash was recorded until after the head was detached at 0.096 second, i n 
a manner similar to that of the 47-mph crash . 
In the record of fuselage - floor deceleration during the 60-mph 
crash, constant velocity is indicated up to the time of onset of engine 
deceleration. During the corresponding time in the 47 - and 42-mph 
crashes, however, alternate fluctuations of positive and negative 
acceleration were recorded (figs . 6(b) and (c )). The highest of these 
frequencies is approximately 100 cps . These fluctuat ions of longitudinal 
acceleration of the fuselage floor probably are associated with the facts 
that the guide slipper leaves the end of the guide rail, the propeller 
tips contact the barrier, and the guide slipper stri kes the bottom of t he 
tunnel before the guide tongue is completely detached from the airplane . 
The absence of any indicated change in fuselage velocity in the 60 -mph 
crash is due to the relative accuracy with whi ch changes in the r ate of 
displacement of the engine could be recorded by photographic data, com-
pared with that of the accelerometer - telemeter system . 
Effect of Impact Speed on Longitudi nal Deceler at ion 
Fuselage . - The effect of i mpact speed on t he longitudinal decelera-
tion of the fuselage floor at the rear seat is shown i n f i gure 7 . These 
data indicate that the maximum decelerat i on does not change appreciably 
with impact speed. The maxi mum g for the three crashes varied from 26 . 5 
to 33 . 5g. This small change in peak decelerati on i ndicates that t he 
structure will sustain only a certain force before a section begins t o 
fail. As each section fails , the load shi fts to other sections, until 
the total decelerative force has been reduced below the magnitude that 
causes failure of the structure . 
In the 60 -mph crash, the fuse l age crumpled to such a degree as to 
allow the leading edge of the '-lings to come in contact with the crash 
barrier, and the resulting damage to the wing structure is shown in 
figure 8 (a ) . This impact of the wings with the barri er undoubtedly 
aided in reducing the decelerative force that was transmitted to the 
fuselage because part of the mass of the wings was decelerated by direct 
~ - - -- - - -- - - - -- --- - - --- --~- --- ---~--- ---
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contact with the barrier . Very little damage occurred to the wings in 
the 47 - and 42 -mph crashes, as shown in figures S (b) and (c) . Since the 
maximum fuselage- floor deceleration for the three crashes did not vary 
appreciably, the duration of the decelerations increased with increasing 
impact speed consistently wi th the higher airplane momentum at impact . 
A measure of this duration can be obtained by noting the time of the 
last maj or peak (fig . 7) . This peak for the 50-mph crash occurred at 
0 . 124 second after impact. The l ast peak deceleration for the 47-mph 
crash occurred at 0 . 076 second after impact , and the last peak for the 
42-mph crash occurred at 0 .061 second after impact . The average rate of 
onset of deceleration of the fuselage floor for the 42 - and 47 -mph 
crashes was approximately 2400g per second and 4600g per second, respec -
tively . 
Chest of dummy . - In making a comparison of the chest decelerations 
to determine the effect of impact speed, data from the 47 -mph crash were 
deleted, because t he dummy was installed with only seat -belt restraint. 
The absence of a shoulder harness permitted the torso to flex around the 
seat belt . Figure 9 is a plot of the longitudinal deceleration of the 
chest against time for the 42 - and the 60 -mph crashes . Decreasing the 
impact speed from 60 to 42 mph reduced the number of major deceleration 
peaks from three to two and also reduced the magnitude of the largest 
deceleration peak from 50 to 32g . The general over- all time during 
which the deceleration was applied for the two impact speeds was approxi-
mately the same . The rate of onset of deceleration decreased from 2200g 
per second for the 60 -mph crash to 950g per second for the 42 -mph crash . 
The peak deceleration for the chest increased slightly more than 
linearly with impact speed, whereas the peak deceleration for the fuse -
lage was not appreciably affected by impact speed. The total time during 
which major chest deceleration occurred did not change appreciably with 
impact speed (fig . 9) , but the total time during which the major peaks 
of fuselage deceleration occurred varied from 0 . 023 second for the 
42 -mph crash to 0.070 second for the 60 -mph crash (fig . 7) . 
Lateral Accelerations 
The lateral accelerations in figure 10 were recorded during the 
crash at an impact speed of 42 mph . As indicated in figure 10, these 
accelerations are insignifi cant relati ve to the magni tudes of the 
accelerations transmitted longitudinally and verticall y from the fuse -
lage to the dummy . Lateral acceleration of the dummy ' s chest and the 
fuselage floor reached peak values of 5 and 6g, respectively, whereas 
vertical and longitudinal acceleration of the dummy ' s chest reached 
lS and 32g, respectively (fig . ll (a )) . Verti cal and longitudinal 
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fUselage-floor acceleration reached respective peaks of 9 (fig . 12) and 
26g (fig. 6(c)). While peak values of lateral acceleration recorded on 
the dummy's chest were approximately the same as those recorded on the 
fUselage floor, there appears to be no phase correlation between the 
two records. Despite the asymmetrical crash configuration, the lateral 
accelerations do not indicate any tendency to predominate in either 
direction. The general trends in lateral acceleration existing ,in the 
42-mph crash are also found in the 47- and 60 -mph crashes. 
Restraining Forces 
Preliminary static tests of safety- harness components . - Several 
types of airplane seat ~elt and shoulder harness were tensile - tested 
statically to determine their breaking and elongation characteristics 
before being installed on the Air Force anthropomorphic and standard 
parachute dummies for the light- airplane crashes . Composite photographs 
of the seat belt and shoulder harness, the stress and strain curves, and 
the specifications of each harness are shown in figure 13. All static 
belt tests, except the test shown in figure 13(b), were conducted by 
installing the belts in a tensile machine so that a straight pull was 
induced lengthwise along the belts . Static tests of the 2-inch Wide, 
commerical se at-belt assembly (fig. 13(a)) resulted in an elongation of 
7~ inches under a 1515-pound tensile load before failure occurred. The 
webbing failed because of the cutting action of the serrations of the 
buckle clamp. 
Other investigators (ref. 4) have considered the possibility that 
in a crash, contrary to the generally used static test configuration, 
the load on the seat belt is so applied that the stresses in the belt 
fibers are unequal. This unequal stress distribution is caused by 
flexion of the torso over the seat belt in the pelvic region in such a 
manner that the two edges are folded toward each other. For the purpose 
of comparing such an asymmetrical loading with a straight -pull tensile 
test, a 2-inch seat belt was tested in a tensile ·machine with the test 
fixture shown in figure l3(b). This fixture held the belt i n a simu-
lated crash configuration that included curvature of the pelvic region, 
folding together of the belt edges across the pelvic region, and a 
total belt length comparable to that used in the straight -pull static 
test . 
In this static test, using the test fixture , the seat belt failed 
at 3020 pounds total load after a total elongation of 8~ inches. Failure 
of the belt was caused by the cutting action of the buckle as indicated 
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in figure 13(b). Comparison of the breaking load of the belt under 
the asymmetrical loading with the straight-PQll loading indicated that 
fiber stresses during the static testing are of the same order, about 
1500 pounds. Thus, no unequal fiber stresses are indicated in the asym-
metrical loading during static testing. For this reason, the seat-belt 
loads recorded in the crash employing the 2-inch seat belt are comparable 
with either of the values found from the tensile tests. 
The 3-inch military seat-belt assembly (fig. l3(c)) was tensile-
tested in a straight pull. It failed under a load of 2620 pounds after 
stretching a total of 5~ inches. Failure of this belt assembly was 
caused by cutting of the webbing by the adjusting buckle. In removing 
this belt assembly from the tensile machine the hook of the fastening 
buckle was found to be broken (fig. l3(c) inset). This break was not 
observed during the test; therefore, the load at which the hook of the 
buckle failed is not known. 
The military shoulder-harness assembly (fig. l3(d)) was tensile-
tested to failure. This failure occurred because of the cutting action 
of the adjusting buckle on the webbing. Prior to failure of the webbing, 
approximately 2 inches of the stitching at t he junction of the two indi-
vidual shoulder straps failed. This belt assembly failed under a load 
of 4725 pounds with a total elongation of l~ inches (fig. l~(d)). 
Restraining Forces During Crash 
42-Mph crash. - The forces acting through the seat belt and the 
shoulder harness to restrain the dummy in his seat and the accelerations 
applied to the chest of the dummy in the 42-mph crash are shown in 
figure ll(a) and (b). Vertical and longitudinal chest accelerations are 
plotted in figure l1(a). Total seat-belt force, plotted in figure ll(b) 
with longitudinal chest deceleration and shoulder-harness force, is the 
sum of the forces recorded at each end of the seat belt. 
During the first 0.04 second following the onset of longitudinal 
chest deceleration, the seat-belt and shoulder-harness loads increased 
in phase. The seat-belt and shoulder-harness forces reached their 
maximum values concurrently with the maximum longitudinal deceleration 
of the chest. The total seat-belt restraining forces reached a maximum 
of 2440 pounds at the same instant (0.082 sec) as the shoulder-harness 
forces reached their maximum value of 1240 pounds. The total restraining 
force~ of the seat belt and shoulder harness would be the sum of these 
two, or 3680 pounds. The total seat-belt force accounts for approximately 
I 
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two-thirds of the total restraining force, while the shoulder harness 
sustained one-third of the total force. The largest stresses , therefore, 
are on the dummy's pelvic-abdominal region, where they exceed 1 ton. It 
can be seen from this data that the total restraining force was equally 
distributed through the three points of attachment of the seat belt and 
shoulder harness on the airplane structure. The use of the shoulder 
harness reduced the total restraining force imposed on the seat belt and 
its attaching structure by approximately 33 percent, and it transmitted 
this portion of the total restraining force to a different point of the 
fuselage structure. Part of the decelerative force acting on the dummy 
is transmitted through its legs, which are in contact with the fuselage 
frame. Applic ation of this force, which varies in magnitude as the air -
plane structure deforms, partially accounts for the difference between 
the shoulder -harness and seat-belt loads after 0.09 second. 
It can be seen from figure ll(b) that, as the chest deceleration 
decreased from its peak value, the total seat-belt force decreased in 
phe.se with the decrease in chest deceleration. Meanwhile, the restrain-
ing forces on the shoulder harness remained at nearly maximum value . 
The fact that these restraining forces remained for approximately 
0.04 second before decreasing may be due to the rigidity of the leg 
j oints of the dummy, so that the dummy pivoted around the seat belt with 
his legs pushing against the torso and thus relieved some of the force 
on the seat belt. 
60-Mph crash. - Figure ll(c) is a plot of the harness restraining 
forces and longitudinal chest deceleration that occurred during the 
60 -mph crash. These curves show the same ,characteristics as were noted 
in the 42 -mph crash, except that peak decelerations and peak forces were 
higher in the 60 -mph crash. Total seat -belt force and shoulder -harness 
force increased in phase with the increase in longitudinal chest 
deceleration. The total seat -belt force reached a maximum of 4050 pounds 
approximately 0.003 second after the first peak in chest deceleration 
of 34g . Maximum shoulder-harness force reached 2050 pounds at 0 . 085 sec-
ond after impact. Total restraining force reached a peak value of 
5800 pounds . Shoulder-harness force remained at nearly maximum value , 
while total seat -belt force dropped to 1400 pounds and then built up to 
a second peak of 3200 pounds . The third peak in longitudinal decelera -
tion rea~hed 50g at 0.120 second after impact . ' 
47-Mph crash. - The dummy was restrained in the 47 -mph impact crash 
by e, 2-inch-wide commercial seat belt . No shoulder harness was employed. 
On the basis of the static elongation and failure tests of the 2- inch-
wide seat -belt, the belt was expected to fail in thi s crash . This seat 
belt was installed on the dummy in order to observe the nature of the 
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failure in the crash, since friction between the belt and the clothing 
of the dummy modifies the belt fiber stresses in a way not well under -
stood at the present time . A second seat belt, 3 inches wide, was used 
in conjunction with the 2- inch-wide seat belt. This 3-inch-wide seat 
belt was adjusted so that its length was 8 inches longer than the com-
mercial 2- inch-wide seat belt . Figure 14(a shows an exaggerated view 
of the length of the seat -belt assembly prior to installation on the 
dummy in the airplane . With this arrangement, both belts being attached 
to tensiometers, a continuous recording of the belt forces was obtained 
up to and following the breaking of the 2- inch-wide seat belt . 
Figures 14(c) and (d) illustrate the relation of total seat-belt 
force to vertical and longitudinal accelerations in the 47-mph crash. 
The vertical and longitudinal chest - acceleration curves are shown in 
figure 14(c); the curve of longitudinal chest deceleration is plotted 
with the total seat-belt force in figure 14(d). 
Total seat -belt restraining force (fig. 14(d)) reached a maximum of 
4400 pounds as the longitudinal chest deceleration reached a peak of 
45.5g. Total seat -belt force increased in phase with longitudinal chest 
deceleration and decreased in phase with the decay in longitudinal chest 
deceleration from its final peak. 
Three peak values appeared in the curve of longitudinal chest 
deceleration, while the seat belt had only two peak values. The three 
peaks in longitudinal chest deceleration occurred because the torso was 
allowed a wide range of movement during deceleration. Because the 
restraining force was applied with only a seat belt, the belt acted as 
a fulcrum about which the torso was allowed to rotate. Between the onset 
of deceleration and the decay from the final peak in deceleration, 
response of the torso to the restraining force is indeterminate . 
The sharp drop in the total seat -belt force is due to the failure 
of the 2- inch-wide seat belt between 0.084 and 0.094 second after impact 
and the subsequent loading of the 3- inch-wide seat belt . Failure of the 
2- inch seat belt is indicated by the rapid rate of decay from the peak 
load (0 . 084 sec after impact). The time during which this sharp drop in 
total seat -belt force occurred (0.006 sec) indicates progressive failure 
of the fibers of the belt webbing from the cutting action of the buckle. 
Figure 14 (b ) is a post - crash photograph shm{ing the break in the 2-inch 
seat belt and the undamaged 3-inch seat belt. 
In sustaining a peak force of 4400 pounds, before failure in the 
47-mph crash, the 2-inch seat belt had withstood 147 percent of the 
breaking force recorded for an identical bel t during the static tensile-
test mock-up (fig. 13(b)). The seat-belt breaking strength under dynamic 
loading in the crash was approximately l~ times as great as the breaking 
load of 3020 pounds under static loading. 
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Vertical chest accelerations in figure 14(c) support the indication 
that the 2-inch seat belt broke between 0.084 and 0.092 second. The 
change of direction recorded in the vertical chest acceleration during 
this time indicates that as the first seat belt broke, it allowed the 
dummy to travel upward, unrestrained, until the dummy contacted the 
second seat belt. As soon as the dummy contacted the second seat belt, 
his momentary upward travel was arrested, as shown by a decrease in 
upward acceleration. Beginning at 0.093 second, the total seat -belt 
force increased in phase with the change in vertical acceleration . 
The motion-picture data showed that the dummy started moving for-
ward from his seat at 0.041 second. This time concurs with the dummy 
movement indicated by the longitudinal chest deceleration. At 0 . 091 sec-
ond, the dummy started to flex around the 3-inch seat belt after the 
2-inch seat belt had broken. 
The drop in total seat -belt force to a value of 1500 pounds at 
0.091 second indicates that the 8-inch slack in the 3-inch-wide seat 
belt was not completely taken up at the time of failure in the 2-inch 
seat belt. After the 2- inch seat belt had failed, the remaining force 
of deceleration was absorbed by the 3-inch seat belt . Maximum displace-
ment of the pelvic region of the dummy was reached at 0.112 second after 
impact, because the displacement consisted of the accumulated elongation 
of both seat belts. 
Maximum bending of the torso about the seat belt did not appear 
until 0.139 second, or 0 . 027 second after maximum displacement of the 
pelvic region of the dummy. Removal of the front seat for this test 
permitted full flexion of the torso around the seat belt . Maximum bend-
ing of the torso was delayed until the longitudinal chest deceleration 
had decreased to values of 7 to 8g . 
Survivability Aspects - I njury Potential 
Deceleration. - The conclusions reached from the work on " Human 
Exposures to Linear Decelerationll (ref . 3 ) were that the severity of the 
physiological damage during decele r ation depends on the magnitude , the 
rate of increase, and the durati on of the deceleration . 
In the study descri bed in reference 3, a human being, carefully 
supported in his seat by a specially designed seat- belt - shoulder-
harness - leg-strap combination, was subjected to a maximum deceleration 
of 45. 3g, existing for a duration of 0 . 228 second, 'vi th a rate of onset 
of deceleration of 493g per second. The injury sustained in this 
deceleration consisted of conjunctival and retinal hemorrhage . These 
injuries were not of sufficient i ntens i ty to prevent continuance of 
normal duties following the test . Definite signs of shock were noted in 
L 
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the same investigation at a plateau value of 38g, when the rate of onset 
of deceleration was increased to 1370g per second. These values of 
maximum deceleration, time of duration, and rate of onset of decelera-
tion were the data obtained from the time-displacement data on the sled 
{ref. 5) on which the human being rode; consequently, they represent 
only the maximum values employed in the study and do not define the 
absolute limits of human tolerance. The chest deceleration measured 
in the crashes reported herein were no higher than the value of 45.4g 
obtained in the study in reference 3. A peak value of 50g of short 
duration, however, was obtained during the 60-mph crash. In investiga-
tions of actual stall- spin accidents conducted by Cornell Crash Injury 
Research, in which the distortion of the airplane structure was equal 
to, or exceeded, that obtained in the 60 -mph crash, the rear passenger 
was frequently found to survive . The 50g peak in deceleration is there-
fore assumed to be survivable. 
Rate of onset of deceleration varied in the light-airplane crashes 
from 1000 to 2500g per second. The 1370g per second rate of onset of 
deceleration used in the studies with human beings is exceeded in some 
of the crashes of this study . It is difficult, however, to appraise 
the full meaning of this fact in terms of hmuan survival, since the 
duration of onset of deceleration was much briefer in the crashes 
reported herein than in the tests in reference 3. 
Bodily contact with structure (seat belt - shoulder harness) . -
Comparison of the relative forward movement of both dummies during the 
42 -mph crash illustrates the limited forward movement of the occupant 
when shoulder harness is worn in addition to the normal seat belt. As 
seen in figure 15, the rear dummy (installed with seat belt and shoulder 
harness) moved forward out of his seat about 8 to 10 inches, the forward 
displacement being limited to the amount of elongation in the webbing 
of the restraining harnesses. In the most forward position, reached at 
0.089 second, the torso was approximately vertical . During this time, 
the front dummy (installed with seat belt only) also moved forward out 
of its seat about the same ,distance, with the torso reaching the vertical 
position. The torso of the front dummy then pivoted around the seat belt 
about 300 past the vertical pOSition, until the forward movement, or rota-
tion, or both, was arrested by the dummy's striking the instrument panel. 
At 0.116 second (fig. 15(b)), the dummy's chest contacted the face of 
the instrument panel, and its chin contacted th~ top of the instrument 
panel. The maximum forward position of the dummy shows that the chest 
of the front-seat occupant in this airplane had been thrown 22 to 
24 inches forward from its normal seated position to strike the instru-
ment panel because it was not held tightly with seat-belt - shoulder-
harness restraint . 
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The front dummy in the 60-mph crash also struck the instrument panel 
in the same manner as illustrated for the 42-mph crash. The front dummy 
in both crashes then bounced back into the normal seated position as 
shown by the post-crash photographs of the 60- and 42-mph crashes in 
figure 16. These figures, when compared with the photograph of an 
undamaged airplane (fig. 3), also illustrate the reduction in distance 
between the front dummy and the instrument panel. The post-crash front-
cockpit clearance decreased as impact speed increased. 
Figure 17(a) is a front view of the dummy, indicating the location 
and the areas of conta ct in the 60-mph crash. Contact of the head with 
the instrument panel was of sufficient intensity to put permanent creases 
in the heavy canvas covering of the dummy's head. The head struck the 
top of the instrument panel over the two areas indicated in figure 17(a) 
and left the dent in the instrument panel as shown in figure 16(a). The 
right-side view of the head in figure 17(b) shows the area over which the 
head contacted the upper right cabin diagonal brace on the rebound. Con-
tact of the chest with the face of the instrument panel over the area 
indicated (fig. 17(a)) was of sufficient force to imbed numerous pieces 
of metal in the felt-fabric covering of the dummy. Definite contact with 
the control stick was indicated in the position shown in figure 17(a). 
Final position of the control stick with respect to both the dummy's 
chest and the instrument panel is shown in figure 16 (a). This figure 
also shows the final position of the knees jammed into the bottom edge 
of the instrument panel. Figure 17(a) indicates areas on the knees 
of the dummy that were cut and torn by this contact . Abrasion marks 
on the cloth covering of the dummy's lower legs indicate contact with 
the lower-cabin removable diagonal braces. The final position of both 
feet in figure 17(b) indicates the severe flexure of both ankles in the 
crumpled forestructure , while the back view shows the area on the back 
of the neck struck by the helmet of the rear dummy . 
A recent statistical analysis (ref . 6 ) shows that of 800 accidents 
that were considered survivable, injuries of the head were more frequent 
than injuries of any of the five remaining gross body areas . Head 
injuries were sustained in 88 percent , or 704, of the 800 accidents 
analyzed. With regard to the occurrence of fatal injuries in accidents 
involving aircraft of all types , German accident statistics (ref . 7) 
reveal that 50 percent of all injuries were injuries of the head, and 
that 70 to 80 percent of the fatal injuries were caused by injuries of 
the head. When the areas over which the front dummy contacted structure 
in the 60 -mph crash (fig . 17 ) are considered, the statistics on human 
injury incurred by this sort of contact in actual acci dents are qui te 
understandable . 
J 
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Bodily contact with structure (seat belt only). - In order to inves -
tigate the sequence of events during displacement of the torso around 
the seat belt, the anthropomorphi c dummy was installed in the rear seat 
with only seat-belt restraint in the 47 -mph crash . To provide unlimited 
movement of the torso about the seat belt, the front seat and the rear 
control stick were removed. Photographs in figure 18 of the 47 -mph crash 
show the movement of the dummy forward out of its seat, followed by rota-
tion of the torso about the seat belt . Without the control stick and the 
front seat to limit the movement of the torso and the head, the torso 
rotated forward and downward until the chest contacted the thighs at 
0 . 118 second after impact (fig . 18 (b )). The distance through which the 
torso and the head swung around the seat belt into the area forward of 
t he dummy was approximately t he length of the to r so from the hips to the 
top of the head . I t is apparent from figure 18 that , if injuries result-
ing from contact with soli d structure are to be avoided when using only 
seat -belt restraint, the estimated distance of 31 to 45 inches (ref . 7) 
forward of the seat must remain free of any solid, sharp, or unyielding 
protuberances . 
Coll apse of cabin structure . - Potential injury of the occupants due 
to inward- collapsing cab i n structure is indicated by comparison of the 
extent of the collapse of the cabin structure in figure 19. The figures 
show photographs of the cabin area following the 42 - , 47 - , and 60-mph 
crashes . As indicated by comparison of these photographs , an increase 
of speed at impact with the barrier caused a corresponding reduction of 
the volume enclosed by the cabin structure . Figure 19(a) shows that, 
during the 42 -mph crash, deformation of the cabin was minor . Appreciable 
reduction in cabin volume was notic€able with an increase of impact speed 
to 47 mph. During this crash, the cabin volume was reduced by the rear-
ward displacement of the instrument panel, as may be detected by comparing 
the posit i on of the upper, forward, right - side diagonal brace in fig -
ure 19 (b ) with its undistorted position after the 42 -mph crash, fig -
ure 19 (a ). With an impact speed of 60 mph, considerable reduct i on in 
cabin volume resulted. This reduction ,resulted from (1) rearward move -
ment of the instrument panel nearly to the front dummy ' s chest and (2) 
collapse of the longerons under the rear seat (fig. 19 ( c» ). Distortion 
of the cabi n structural tubing during cabin deformati on may increase the 
probabili ty of injury to the occupants . An example of this distortion 
is shown by the upper cabin members projecting into the proximity of 
the heads of both dummies in figure 19 (c ). I t i s evi dent from inspection 
of figure 19 that , i f occupants of an airplane during a crash are to be 
protected from the additi onal hazard of striking the deformed cabin 
structural members collapsi ng around them, the cabi n structure itself 
must be strong enough t o resi st the decelerative forces occurring at 
impact . 
• 
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Fire hazard. - To permit some insight into the possibility of the 
occurrence of fire after crash, the distribution of fuel spillage during 
a crash was investigated during the 60-mph crash. In this crash, the fuel 
tank contained 8.7 gallons (75 percent of its volume) of red-dyed water to 
replace the weight of the normal 12-gallon supply of gasoline. 
Figure 20 shows the damage to the fuel tank in the 60- and 42-mph 
crashes. In each crash the fuel tank was crushed between the fire wall 
and the instrument panel. In the 60-mph crash, the tank was burst at 
the seams and the sheet metal was torn open by hydraulic loading. The 
tank was compressed to one-half of its original volume in the crash. 
Figure 20(b) shows that the empty tank was only deformed and crushed, 
with no bursting of the seams and no tearing of the parent sheet metal, 
in the 42-mph crash. 
The fuel-spread pattern (fig. 21) of the 60 -mph crash reveals a 
heavy concentration of fuel around the engine, throughout the cabin, and 
over approximately 66 percent of the under surface of the right wing . 
The fuel spillage within the passenger compartment and on both dummies, 
if ignited, would have completely inflamed their clothing. In the two 
crashes in which a dummy was installed in the front seat, the manner in 
which its foot was pinned in the wreckage indicates that, if fire were 
to occur, a human occupant in the same position would experience extreme 
difficulty in extricating himself before fire enveloped the entire air-
plane. Figure 16 shows the front dummy's foot pinned between the fire 
wall and the right-side removable diagonal brace. 
If this fuel spillage is typical of that occurring during an actual 
accident with airplanes having fuel tanks in a location similar to those 
used in these crashes, a disastrous fire would result if ignition 
occurred. CAB statistical analysis of the first 3000 non-air carrier 
accidents reported in 1952 (ref. 8) shows that, of 2344 accidents involv-
ing airplanes used for instructional purposes, pleasure flying, and 
personal transportation, approximately 3.84 percent caught fire after 
crash. Fortunately, ignition sources of sufficient intensity to ignite 
gasoline do not appear consistently with this type of engine installa-
tion. 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results obtained from the full-scale light-airplane crash 
investigation, in which stall-spin accidents were simulated, are sum-
marized in the following table: 
22 llJACA TN 2991 
Speed Maximum Maximum Maximum Duration of Peak total 
at longi - longi- longi- maximum restrain-
impact tudina1 tudinal tudinal peak longi- ing force, 
with engine decelera- decelera- tudinal rear dummy, 
barrier, decelera- tion of tion of deceleration lb 
mph tion, chest of fuselage of fuselage 
g rear under at rear 
dummy, rear seat, 
g seat, sec 
g 
42 32.5 32 26.5 0.023 3680 
47 46.0 46 32.5 .038 4400 
60 62.0 50 33.5 .070 5800 
These data show that, for the stall-spin accldent s imulated: 
1. Longitudinal deceleration of the chest of the dummy in the rear 
seat ranged from 32 to 50g when the crash impact speed varied from 42 
to 60 mph . 
2 . Peak longitudinal chest deceleration exceeded longitudinal 
fuselage - floor deceleration by 6 to 16g in all crashes. 
3 . Deceleration of the fuselage at the rear-seat location did not 
increase appreciably (26 to 33g) as impact speed increased from 42 
to 60 mph, but the time during which signific:ant deceleration persisted 
increased from 0 . 023 to 0 . 070 second. 
4 . Total peak force imposed on the restraining harnesses increased 
in proportion with the increase of impact speed and reached a maximum 
of 5800 pounds in the 60 -mph crash . 
5 . Occupants of airplanes of the type used in this investigation 
would not be endangered by deforming cabin structure unless crash impact 
speeds exceeded 42 mph . 
6 . The results of this study show that the decelerations imposed by 
thi s airplane and crash configuration up to impact speeds of 60 mph, with 
the rear- seat occupant r estrained by seat bel t and shoulder harness, are 
wi thin the decelerations shown by aeromedical research to be tolerable 
by human bei ngs . 
• 
tl) 
to 
to 
N 
NACA TN 2991 23 
7. In order to avoid injury-producing contact when only seat-belt 
restraint is used, the space in front of the occupant must remain free 
of obstacles for a distance approximately equal to the length of the 
torso from the hips to the top of the head (plus the seat-belt elonga-
tion) . 
8. The maximum total restraining forces recorded indicate that, 
when seat-belt restraint is used alone, these belts should be capable of 
withstanding higher breaking loads than those presently in use. All com-
ponents of the restraining harness system should be attached to the basic 
airframe structure, unless the seat and its attachment are capable of 
withstanding the restraining forces. 
Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
Cleveland, OhiO, May 11, 1953 
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(a ) Pbotograpb of t wo-sea t tandem airplane used in investigation, sbowing r elation of airplane engine and left wing to front 
edge of eartben crasb barrier . 
Figure 1. - Mecbani sm f or ligbt-ai r pLane cr asb investigation . 
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(b) Guide slipper and guide tongue assembly i nstalled 
on guide r ai l. 
(c ) Stee l t ube installed at base of crash barrier f or 
disposal of guide tongue and slipper a ssemb ly. 
Airplane fuseloge; lefl side 
~ 
C-32981 
(d) Attachment of tongue to fuselage, showing shear-pin l ocation . 
Figure 1 . - Continued. Mechan i sm for light-airplane crasb investiga tion . 
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(e) Extended tail- truss support for holding airplane in flight attitude . 
Tensiometer 
(f) Anchor pier installed on guide rail to r etain airplane before release . 
Figure 1. - Concluded . Mechanism for light-airplane crash investigation . 
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Figure 2 . - Plan view of crash area for conducting light-airplane crash investigation. 
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Figure 3 . - Typical installation of anthropomorphic and parachute dummies in airplane. 
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C Tensiometer - sboulder barness 
D Accelerometer - bead 
E Accelerometers - cbest 
F Tensiometers - seat belt 
G Accelerometers - f l oor, 60 mpb 
G' Accelerometers - floor, 42 , 47 mpb 
(a) General locat ion of instrumentation in airplane. 
Figure 4. - Instrumentation used in light-airplane crash investigation. 
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Crasb- pr otection arrangement, top view Before installation 
Mounted in protective box and installed 
(b ) Mobile te lemeter transmitter station. 
Figure 4. - Continued . Instrumentati on used in light-airplane crash investigation. 
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(c) Ten- cbannel telemeter receiving and recording station. 
Tensiomete r Accelerometer ~ 
(d) Te lemeter transducers . C- 33003 
Figur e 4. - Continued . Instrumentation used in ligbt --a irplane crasb investigation . 
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(e ) Accelerometers installed on chest of rea r d~y. (f ) Acce lerometer insta lled in bead of r ear dummy . 
Figure 4. - Continued . Instrumentation used in l igbt-a irplans crasb investigation . 
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(g) Accelerometers installed on fuselage 
f loor at rear seat i n 60-mph crash. 
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i 
(b ) Sboulder-barness tensiometer . 
Left (1) Seat-belt tensiometers at rear seat . Right 
Figure 4. - Continued . Instrumentation used in ligbt-a i rplane crasb investigation . 
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(j) Oscillograph records from 47-mph crash. ~ 
Figure 4. - Continued. Instrumentation used in light-airplane crash investigation. 
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(k) Ground b raid)and ~lastic tubi ng over control cab l e /to elimi nate extraneous noise . 
I 
LZ 
. 1 
\' 
(n Bank of flash bulbs t o provide auxiliary illumination in cabin area during impact. 
Figure 4. - Concluded. Instrumentation used in light-airplane crash investigation. 
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Figure 5. - Reaction of seated body to longitudinal and vertical accelerations. 
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F1gure 6 . - Long1tud1na1 decelerat1 0n of engine , fuselage fl oor at rear seat, and 
chest and head of rear dummy . 
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(b) Impact speed, 47 mph. 
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Figure 6 . - Continued. Longitudinal decelerat i on of engine , fusel age 
floor at rear seat , a nd ches t and head of rear dummy . 
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Figure 6 . - Concluded . Longitudinal deceleration of engine, fuselage floor at 
rear seat , and chest and head of rear dummy . 
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Figure 7. - Effect of impact speed on lOI18itudinal deceleration of fuselage at rear .eat. 
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(a) Impact speed, 60 mph. (b) Impact speed, 47 mph . 
(c ) Impact speed, 42 mph. 
Figure 8 . - Damage to wing and fuselage of airplane resulting from impact with crash barrier. 
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Figur e 9 . - Eff ec t of impact speed on l ongitudinal dec elerat i on of r ear dummy 's chest . 
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Figure 10. - Time history of lateral acceleration as measured on chest of rear dummy 
and fuselage floor at rear Beat in 42-mph crash. 
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(b) Longitudinal chest deceleration and restraining forces . Impact speed, 42 mph . 
Figur e 11 . - Relation of har nes s r estraining forces to vertical and longitudinal 
chest accelera t i ons . 
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Fi gure 11. - Concluded. Relation of harness r estra ining forc es to vertical and longi-
tudinal chest accel erations. 
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Figure 12. - Vertical acceleration of fuselage floor at rear seat in 42-mph 
crash. 
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(a ) Light- airplane seat belt (new) . Width , 2 inches; Atr Associates model number, M- 5100; 
rated strength of assembly, 1500 pounds . 
Figure 13 . - Results of static tensi l e tests on airplane safety belts . 
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Figure 13. - Continued . Results of static tenaile tests on airp lane safety belts . 
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(c) Military seat belt . Width, 3 inches . 
Figure 13 . - Continued . Results of static tensile tests on airplane safety belts. 
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Figure 13 . - Concluded. Results of static tensile test s on airplane safe ty belts . 
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(a) Seat-belt configuration as installed on rear dummy. 
(b) Failure of 2- incb seat belt during cr asb. 
Figure 14. - Relation of t ota l seat -belt f orce to vertical and longitudinal 
accelerations in 47-mpb crasb. 
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Figure 14. - Concluded. Relation of total seat-belt force to vertical 
and longitudinal accelerations in 47- mph crash. 
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(a) Impact to 0.080 second . 
Figure 15 . - Displacement of airplane and dummies during deceleration in 42-mph crash . 
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(b) 0.089 to 0.170 second. 
Figure 15. - Concluded . Displa cement of airplane and dummies during decele r a t ion in 
42-mpb crasb. 
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(a) Impact speed, 60 mph. 
Figure 16. - Position of parachute dummy in front seat of airplane after crash. 
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(b) Impact speed, 42 mpb . 
Figure 16. - Concluded . Position of paracbute dummy in front seat of a irplane after crasb . 
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Figure 17. - Location, area, and cause of blows sustained by front-seat dummy in 50-mph 
crasb. 
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Figure 17. - Concluded. Locat1on, area, and cause of blows sustained by front-seat dUlJlllly 
in 60-mph crash . 
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(a) Impact to 0 . 082 second. 
Figure 18 . - Displacement of airplane and rear dummy during deceleration in 47 -mpb crasb . 
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(b) 0 . 091 to 0.173 second . 
Figure 18 . - Concluded. Displacement of airplane and rear dummy during deceleration in 
47 - mpb crasb. 
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(a) Impact speed, 42 mph . 
Figure 19. - Crash damage to airplane struct ure . 
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(b) ImIE ct speed, 47 mpb. 
Figure 19. - Continued. Crasb damage to airplane structure. 
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(c) Impact speed, 60 mph. 
Figure 19. - Concluded . Crash damage to airplane structure . 
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(a) Impact speed, 60 mph. 
Figure 20 . - Extent of damage to full fuel tank during a crash. 
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(b) Impact speed, 42 mpb . 
Figure 20 . - Conc l uded. Extent of damage to empty fuel tank during a crasb . 
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Figure 21. - Fue1.-spread pattern and concentration during 60-mph crash. 
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